Using System Dynamics to Model and Better Understand State Stability by Choucri, Nazli et al.
MIT Sloan School of Management
MIT Sloan School Working Paper 4661-07
7/1/2007
Using System Dynamics to Model and Better Understand
State Stability
© 2007 Nazli Choucri, Daniel Goldsmith, Stuart E. Madnick, Dinsha Mistree, J. Bradley Morrison, Michael D. Siegel
Nazli Choucri, Daniel Goldsmith, Stuart E. Madnick, Dinsha Mistree, J. Bradley Morrison, Michael D. Siegel
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without
explicit permission, provided that full credit including © notice is given to the source.
This paper also can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011230
 
 
 
Using System Dynamics to Model and Better Understand  
State Stability 
 
Nazli Choucri 
Daniel Goldsmith 
Stuart E. Madnick 
Dinsha Mistree 
J. Bradley Morrison 
Michael D. Siegel  
 
 
 
 
Working Paper CISL# 2007-03 
 
July 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Composite Information Systems Laboratory (CISL) 
Sloan School of Management, Room E53-320 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Cambridge, MA 02142 
 1
Using System Dynamics to Model and Better Understand  
State Stability 
 
Nazli Choucri 1 
Daniel Goldsmith 2 
Stuart E. Madnick 3 
Dinsha Mistree1 
J. Bradley Morrison4 
Michael D. Siegel 2 
 
1 Political Science Department 
2 Sloan School of Management 
3 Sloan School of Management and School of Engineering 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
30 Wadsworth Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA 
 
4International Business School 
Brandeis University 
415 South Street, Waltham, MA 02454, USA 
 
nchoucri@mit.edu, dgoldsmi@mit.edu, jbm@kurtsalmon.com, 
smadnick@mit.edu, dmistree@mit.edu, msiegel@mit.edu 
 
Abstract 
 
The world can be complex and dangerous - the loss of state stability of countries is of 
increasing concern.  Although every case is unique, there are important common 
processes.  We have developed a system dynamics model of state stability based on an 
extensive review of the literature and debriefings of subject matter experts. We represent 
the nature and dynamics of the ‘loads’ generated by insurgency activities, on the one 
hand, and the core features of state resilience and its ‘capacity’ to withstand these 
‘loads’, on the other.  The challenge is to determine when threats to stability override the 
resilience of the state and, more important, to anticipate conditions under which small 
additional changes in anti-regime activity can generate major disruptions. With these 
insights, we can identify appropriate and actionable mitigation factors to decrease the 
likelihood of radical shifts in behavior and enhance prospects for stability. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The loss of state stability in various parts of the world is a major threat to U.S. national 
security.  While every case is unique, there are common processes tending toward 
instability.  In its Preface, The 9/11 Commission Report states: “We learned that the 
institutions charted with protecting…national security did not understand how grave this 
threat can be, and did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices to deter or defeat it.” 
[1: xvi].  Given current realities and uncertainties, “better preparedness” can be achieved 
by identifying, controlling and managing the linkages and situational factors that fuel 
hostilities and undermine stability and cohesion.     
 
Over the course of six months1, researchers from MIT and elsewhere worked with 
DARPA2 to develop computational social science models for understanding the nature of 
state stability as well as propensities for state failure and collapse.  The MIT team 
developed a system dynamics model to understand and represent sources and 
consequences of stability, as well as ways in which the potential for disruptions could be 
reduced, managed or mitigated.  This paper describes our conceptualization of how and 
when threats to stability might override the resilience of the state and undermine its 
overall capabilities and performance. More specifically, we isolate the conditions under 
which small changes in anti-regime activity can generate major disruptions – and then 
seek to identify appropriate actionable mitigation factors to reduce the potential for 
undesirable shifts in behavior and enhance prospects for stability.   
 
 
2.  Background and Context 
 
We begin by placing the key issues in context, first by noting insights from the social 
sciences and then by highlighting some key system dynamics modeling features. 
   
2.1   State Stability  
 
The stability of a state is a process, in that states can be at different stages of ‘stability’ 
and subject to different pressures toward instability.  There are multiple modes of 
fragility as well as different paths toward a range of ‘end points.’  It is well known that 
studies of state stability (and fragility) are closely connected to a wide range of issues in 
the social and the computational sciences such as the analyses of civil war, political 
mobilization, social disturbances, institutional development (or lack thereof), economic 
performance, social cohesion, ethnic violence and a range of issue areas that bear directly 
on the resilience of states and their capabilities, as well as on the pressures upon the state 
and the types of threats to its integrity and stability.  
 
One of the most recognizable indications of state instability is the onset of civil war.  
While it may be impossible to predict an individual catalyst for a civil war, there are 
                                                 
1 From April to October 2005. 
2 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
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many elements that make a state predisposed towards the breakout of civil war.  For 
instance, the most likely states for civil war are those states that have recently undergone 
another war, states whose neighbors are involved in civil war, and states that are 
economically weak [2].  However, many social scientists and policy-makers identify the 
best device for preventing civil war as democracy [3; 4]. Yet, Siegle, Weinstein and 
Halperin show that on a global basis the evidence regarding which comes first, 
democracy or development, is still contentious [5].  By the same token, Hegre, et al. show 
that the greatest likelihood of civil war is not in a state which is the least-democratic, but 
rather civil war is much more likely to break out in a state which is semi-democratic [6].3 
Our approach to state stability takes these divergent perspectives into account, but adopts 
a rather different approach.   
 
Given the wide range of contentions regarding sources and consequences of state 
stability, an initial step is to define the core proposition in order to render precision and 
direction for the computational and modeling strategy. The proposition is this:  
 
A state is stable to the extent that its resilience (capabilities) is greater than the 
load (or pressures) exerted upon it.   
 
Embedded in a high level model of state stability, this proposition helps guide 
formulation of the system dynamics model.  
 
Social scientists in general, and political scientists in particular, are in general agreement 
regarding the nature of the state, its fundamental features, and its generic attributes – 
irrespective of specific manifestations or characteristics shaped by time or location.  
Rooted in the basic contributions of Aristotle’s Politics all states consist of, and are 
governed by, a complex body of relationships and institutions framed and guided by a 
constitution [7].  Many centuries later, Almond and Powell put forth a formal approach to 
state capacities by defining a set of specific capabilities (namely, extractive, regulative, 
responsive, distributive, and symbolic) [8].  These points support our premise that a state 
is stable to the extent that the loads or pressures upon it can be managed by its prevailing 
capabilities or performance capacities.  
 
2.2 System Dynamics  
   
System dynamics is an approach for modeling and simulating (via computer) complex 
physical and social systems and experimenting with the models to design policies for 
management and change [9].  The core of the modeling strategy is representation of 
system structure in terms of stocks and of flows.  In this connection, feedback loops are 
the building blocks for articulating the dynamics of these models and their interactions 
can represent and explain system behavior.   
 
Created by Jay Forrester, system dynamics modeling (SDM) has been used as a method 
of analysis, modeling and simulation for more than 50 years.  SDM has been used for a 
                                                 
3 This one-dimensional scale was originally constructed by Ted Robert Gurr in conjunction with the Polity 
project.  Visit http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ for the complete dataset.   
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wide range of purposes, such as to capture the dynamic relationship of energy and the 
economy [10], to model the world petroleum market over a period of thirty decades [11], 
to explore dynamics of economic growth [12] to analyze the environmental implications 
of international trade [13], to understand supply-chain management [14], to analyze 
different policies for nation-building [15], to model software development [16], and to 
examine the intricacies of the air force command and control systems [17]. 
 
SDM offers unique capabilities to contribute to social science, economics, or political 
science modes of analysis.  SDM recognizes the complex interactions among many 
feedback loops, rejects notions of linear cause-and-effect, and requires the analyst to view 
a complete system of relationships whereby the ‘cause’ might also be affected by the 
‘effect’.  SDM enables analysts to uncover ‘hidden’ dynamics.  Moreover, SDM allows 
the analyst an increased level of flexibility as SDM utilizes both conceptual 
understanding as well as empirical data collection.  As Forrester explains, “the first step 
[in SDM] is to tap the wealth of information that people possess in their heads.  The 
mental database is a rich source of information about the parts of a system, about the 
information available at different points in a system, and about the policies being 
followed in decision making.” [18: 5] 
 
The system dynamics modeling process translates these elements of causal logic into 
systems of integral equations [19].  Empirical analysis is also used to explain the 
relationships between individual elements in the overall system.  By understanding the 
dynamics of a state system, including interactions among actors, actions, structures and 
processes in complex environments, one can better identify how to reinforce state 
capabilities while diminishing the loads and pressures exerted upon it.   
 
 
3.  Modeling State Stability 
    
3.1   Overview of Process 
 
For modeling purposes, the first step is to define the overall domain and system of 
elements tending toward state stability and the sources of instability. This step yields a 
high level view that is used for framing purposes, consistent with dominant lines of 
thinking in the social sciences.  The value of system dynamics is that it also provides a 
method for empirical model grounding as well as policy crafting.  
 
The next step  is to select and ‘drill down’ to the most important, sensitive and short-term 
processes that shape the more immediate threats to stability and enhance the propensities 
for instability.  
 
The third step is to formulate the overall computational system dynamics model for 
simulation and analysis  drawing where possible on empirical data and observable cases.  
The computational system itself consists of interconnected modules that represent 
different facets of the overall processes at hand. 
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Drawing upon data from two real-world cases, we developed and then used the model to 
make further predictions about insurgency recruiting, recognize different policy 
implications, and make informed policy decisions based upon empirical measurements.   
 
 
3.2   The High-Level View  
 
We begin by creating a high-level causal loop diagram that captures the key elements of 
the system in question including the major feedback loops.  The diagram reflects a range 
of potentially significant joint dependencies and feedback processes that explain the 
dynamics of the overall stability status of the state; over time. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: High-Level Diagram of State Stability. (Circled section signals the 
segments for detailed system dynamics modeling) 
Arrows show causal relationships between variables.  A plus sign (+) indicates that a change in the first 
variable (at the tail of the arrow) causes a change in the second variable (at the head of the arrow) in the 
same directions.  A minus sign (-) indicates that a change in the first variable causes a change in the second 
variable in the opposite directions.  A path that begins at any variable and traces from arrow to arrow to 
returns to the original variable forms a feedback loop 
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Figure 1 presents the High-Level Diagram of overall state stability. We seek here only to 
define broadly the overall domain as well as the SD model focus (encompassed within the 
dashed lines).  . 
 
In many cases, there were large bodies of literature that described each of the key 
relationships.  Framed thus, we seek only to reflect some of the most dominant sets of 
relationships reflected in the literature, by way of developing an integrated device for 
representing the complexities of underlying dynamics. 
 
3.3   Drilling Deeper  
 
In Figure 1, the dotted line delineates several elements in the High-Level Diagram that 
we select as the focus for our detailed modeling process.  These focus on Regime 
Legitimacy and the role of Insurgents in Anti-Regime activities. 
 
Three factors are relevant here: 
 
First, we chose a time horizon over which long-term ramifications might be significantly 
different than short-term outcomes.  We wanted to choose examples where this would be 
especially pronounced.   
 
Second, we wanted a model boundary sufficiently broad so as to allow us to explore and 
explain the strengths and weaknesses of a variety of policy options.   
 
Third, we chose to focus on system-features that would best illustrate the contributions of 
system dynamics to policy analysis as well as to the social sciences. 
 
Based on all these considerations, we selected to ‘drill down’ into the dynamics of 
dissident and insurgent recruiting given the resilience of the state and its capacity to 
manage anti-regime activities.4   
 
The dynamic simulation and modeling analysis of insurgency-vs.-state-resilience would 
become our Proof of Concept Model.   
 
 
 
 
3.4   Strategy for Proof of Concept  
 
The starting point for modeling the potential growth of dissidents and insurgents was 
recruiting.  We considered and sought to represent the different causes and effects of such 
recruiting.  Model formulation was done in four interactive stages.   
 
                                                 
4 Many of these subjects were saved in case we had the opportunity to pursue future modeling.  They 
ranged from analyzing instances of famine and food shortage to the mobilization and propagation of 
fundamental terrorism.   
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(1)  A thorough and comprehensive literature review in order to familiarize ourselves 
with the key terms and to capture the current state of understanding of insurgent 
recruitment.  
 
(2)   A set of interviews conducted with relevant experts and personnel, namely 
military experts, country analysts, and scholars in order to generate further insight.  
 
(3)  Use of existing empirical work to explain relationships that would hold for a 
range of states, and thus to develop generic representation of complex dynamics. 
 
(4) Testing with country-specific information for two test cases: Country A and 
Country B.5  Country-specific information came from personnel, online newspapers, 
databases constructed by government organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
and experts.   
 
Throughout the process, we considered how different policies would affect the dynamics 
of the model. 
 
 
4.  Proof of Concept Model 
 
Below we present the system dynamics state stability model, beginning first with an 
overview of the entire system and structure, and then addressing key components 
sequentially. 
 
 
4.1   System Structure - Overview 
 
The model shows the sources and consequences of insurgent recruiting, constrained and 
limited by the resilience of the regime and the extent to which the state can manage anti-
regime activities. To simplify, of the many actions that insurgents chose to perform in 
order to undermine regime legitimacy, we model those associated with activites that lead 
to stimulating, producing and circulating anti-regime “communications” and 
“messaging”6.   
 
Anti-regime messaging and communication are thus major mechanisms for increasing 
insurgent recruitment and for mobilizing opponents to the regime.  The context in which 
these activities occur is partly shaped by the regime.  The state’s capabilities and the 
resilience of the regime operate such as to counter insurgency recruitment.    
 
                                                 
5 One of the requirements for the DARPA contract was that all teams make real predictions for two 
countries.  Thus Country A and Country B represent two existing countries. 
6 Communications and messaging are broadly defined. For example, a successful terrorist attack is a form 
of “message” that can be “communicated” – even if only by word-of-mouth. Communication and 
messaging are both facilitated by social networks. 
 8
Figure 2 represents the segment of Figure 1 (bounded by the dotted line) that is further 
developed to constitute our proof-of-concept model. Figure 2 also includes a 
segmentation of the model into sub-systems, such as Population Growth, Regime 
Resilience, Anti-Regime Recruiting, Regime Opposition, Reducing Overt Opposition, 
and Communications and Mobilization.  These are examined in greater detail below.  
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Figure 2: Conceptual Model of Insurgent Activity and Recruitment (Simplified) 
 
The logic of the model can account for many known patterns of insurgent recruiting in 
relation to the role and influence of the regime and its resilience7.  The model structure 
and framework is based heavily on the social science literature and earlier studies in the 
computational social sciences, as well as on “tapping into the wealth of information that 
people possess in their heads” [18]. 
 
The remainder of this section presents the key components of the model and articulates 
the basic logic in the course of “unfolding” the structure of the behavior of the system.  A 
list of some of the sources of information supporting each link in the model is presented 
in Appendix A. 
 
                                                 
7 The formulated model includes about 140 equations.   
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4.2   Sources of Insurgents 
 
We proceed from the assumption that in any given state with a given number of people 
there are some peaceful anti-regime elements (dissidents) and there are some violent anti-
regime elements (insurgents).  Thus, we divide the population into three stocks, labeled 
Population, Dissidents, and Insurgents, and shown as rectangles in Figure 3.  The model 
shows transitions from one stock to the other with icons resembling pipes and valves8. 
People in the general population may become dissidents and after some time these 
dissidents may become insurgents.  However, all dissidents do not necessarily become 
insurgents. , Dissidents might become appeased by the state and return to the general 
population.  A peaceful regime change or a policy change may placate these dissidents 
into regime supporters.  Alternatively, dissidents who become insurgents can be removed 
from the system by the state.  This could occur through arrests, detentions, or state 
violence.  These approaches to reducing the number of dissidents and insurgents, 
respectively, are shown as the “Appeasement Rate” and “Removing Insurgents” in Figure 
3. 
       
Dissidents Insurgents
Insurgent
Recruitment
Removed
InsurgentsRemoving
Insurgents
Population
Becoming
Dissident
Appeasement
Rate
Pop Growth
              Figure 3: Population-to-Insurgent Flow 
  
There are other conditions affecting the Population-to-Insurgent flows.  Different 
elements can affect the transition of a normal member of society to a dissident to an 
insurgent, as we note below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The valves control the rate of flow between the stocks.  The factors that affect these rates are explained 
later. 
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4.3   Removal of Insurgents 
 
The next level of complexity is presented in Figure 4.  
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 Figure 4: Other Ways to Affect the Population-to-Insurgent Flow 
 
When considering the insurgent removal, we must also consider the removal 
effectiveness, the indicated force strength, and the desired time to remove insurgents in 
order to assess the rate at which insurgents are removed.  Policy levers, such as the 
amount of resources allocated to each method, that effect these variables are exogenous 
to our model,, but we can test various policy options by varying these parameters. 
 
 
4.4   Anti-Regime Messaging and the Flow of Communication 
 
In Figure 5, we expand the model to show that dissidents and insurgents take actions we 
call anti-regime incidents which in turn generate anti-regime messages.  Such incidents 
include protests, targeted attacks, or even civil war.  ‘Messages’ include both formal and 
informal communications between individuals in a regime.   
 
An anti-regime message based upon an intense incident might proclaim that the regime 
violently cracked down on innocent protestors, or that the regime can no longer 
effectively handle insurgent movements in a certain part of the country and is therefore 
incapable of controlling the state.  Messages of this sort can undermine the legitimacy of 
the regime and represent an important form of loads on state capacity.  The load becomes 
especially strong when it is reinforced by, and diffused through, social networks, thus 
facilitating recruitment further, as seen in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Message Production Generated by Dissident and Insurgent Incidents 
 
Once again, there are many policy options available for limiting the flow of anti-regime 
messages.  Such options are often utilized, in countries as diverse as France, (which 
imposed curfews on its citizens to quell riots in October and November of 2005) and 
Thailand (where the South has been in a state of martial law since March of 2005).  At 
the same time, we recognize that perceptions may be different from actual behavior and 
there might be differences in the effectiveness of such attempts to limit the flow of anti-
regime messages.   
 
 
4.5   The Role of Perceptions and Cognition 
 
Accordingly, in Figure 6, we take into account the perceived intensity of anti-regime 
messages and the relative frequency of anti-regime messages.  
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Figure 6: Accounting for Perceptions 
 
The effectiveness of the insurgent communications methods can either magnify the 
“apparent” intensity of the Anti-Regime messages, such as through the increased use of 
internet and satellite television, or diminish the “apparent” intensity if not effective.  As 
Anti-Regime messages become more frequent than normal, the relative frequency of anti-
regime messages increases, bolstering dissident and insurgent recruitment.  
 
4.6   Regime Resilience  
 
The critical constraint on insurgency expansion is the resilience of the state.  The SDM 
model represents state resilience through an empirically derived function of key 
determinants, as indicated in the social science literature.  Specifically, we combine 
measures of economic performance, regime legitimacy, political capacity, and social 
capacity, as shown at the lower left of Figure 7, to compute the aggregate regime 
resilience, via the relationship: 
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Figure 7: Regime Resilience  
 
The effects of anti-regime messages on dissident recruitment are taken into account, as 
shown in Figure 7 where the “Normal Probability of Being Recruited” is modified 
(increased or decreased) as a result of the “Effect of Anti-Regime Messages on 
Recruitment” and the “Effect of Regime Resilience on Recruitment” to compute the 
“Propensity to be Recruited.”   
 
Considering our earlier discussion of capacities versus loads, regime resilience can be 
considered as a measure of the long-term capacities of a state.  The literature notes that 
the resilience of a state is inversely related to the occurrence of civil war. We find 
empirical support for this relationship when comparing the state resilience function to the 
determinants of civil war as determined by Hegre et al. [6].  Hegre, et al. looked at all 
occurrences of civil wars across the world over the last several decades.  They were able 
to produce a measure that determines the likelihood of a civil war breaking out.   
 
 14
As we would expect, for the case of Country A, the Relative Risk of Civil War declines 
as the computed Resilience index rises, as shown in Figure 8. This suggests that insurgent 
movements are being contained from further breakouts at the national level.   
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Figure 8:   Regime Resilience vs. Relative Risk of Civil War 
 
A detailed discussion of the factors and the calculation of the Relative Risk of Civil War 
(RCW) used in Figure 8 can be found in Appendix B: “Hegre-Relative Risk of Civil War 
Memo.” 
  
 
4.7    Review of Loads vs. Capabilities 
 
Regime resilience can mitigate against insurgent recruitment, thereby preventing an 
increase in the load on the the system.  For example, when the economy is doing well or 
when the regime is perceived as having increased legitimacy, the likelihood of an 
individual becoming a dissident or an insurgent becomes much smaller.  The foci of the 
loads and capabilities of the system are highlighted in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Identifying Loads and Capabilities 
 
Re-examining the usage of policies specifically designed to stem message flows through 
reductions in civil liberties, we see that in the short-term such policies can reduce the 
messaging capabilities but in the long-term such policies can undermine the social 
capacity of a state and will therefore undermine the regime resilience.  This is an example 
of the potentially counter-intuitive “second order” affects of certain approaches to 
addressing insurgents. 
 
As a result, while there are fewer avenues for messages to circulate, these messages are 
more effective at converting individuals into dissidents and insurgents as individuals are 
less happy with the regime.  Therefore the state and the regime should be wary of 
enforcing short-term controls with deleterious effects and should instead create and foster 
policies focused on improving the capacities of the state, which in turn will balance the 
loads.   
 
5.  Results of Proof of Concept Model 
 
We have used our model to explore the impact of various changes in the exogenous 
factors as well as the impact of various policy options. In this section, we will present two 
sets of simulation results, for the two different countries that we studied, that show two 
fundamentally different modes of behavior – long-term growth in the number of 
insurgents and long-term decline in the number of insurgents  In these simulations, we 
explore (a) the impacts of a decline in regime resilience and (b) an example of the 
impacts of different policy prescriptions, in particular, removing insurgents vs. reducing 
anti-regime messages and identify tipping points in which the system shifts from one 
mode of behavior to the other. 
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5.1   Decline in Regime Resilience 
 
Recall our interest in identifying the conditions in which the loads on the system exceed 
the capacities to manage the loads.  At such points, regime resilience will no longer be 
able to ‘fend off’ insurgency behavior.  In Figure 10 we show several simulations,  in the 
base case, depicted by the blue line, the number of insurgents is declining as of 2006.  
The simulations introduce various possible sudden drops in regime resilience (left graph) 
and the corresponding response in the number of insurgents that are generated by those 
reductions in the state capacity (right graph).  
 
Specifically, these figures show the resulting growth in insurgency with various 
reductions in long-term state capacities (known as Regime Resilience in the model)9.  
Examples of situations that have caused reductions in regime resilience include election 
fraud, oil shock on economy, healthcare failure, and judicial breakdown. These figures 
are based upon observations, estimates, and predictions in a specific region of Country A, 
where insurgency has fluctuated for the last several years.   
 
 
Figure 10:  Capacities and Loads 
 
Under the initial “base” case10 (shown as the blue lines in both the Capacities and Loads 
diagrams), we see a slight reduction in insurgents and Loads on the system over time.  
But as the other scenarios show, even small declines in the capacities of the state change 
the direction to one of future insurgent growth and increase of the Loads on the system – 
thus a ‘tipping point.’11  An initial small drop in resilience produces what appear at first 
                                                 
9 Figure 10 was developed in color. If viewed in black and white, each of the four drops in resilience is 
matched with the four increasing curves of Insurgent Loads. 
10 For country A 
11 The numbers presented in Figures 10a and 10b on the axes are based upon a specific case study., The true 
value of system dynamics does not come from empirical statements such as “if you reduce the economy 
10%, you will increase insurgents by 10%,” but rather “if the economy drops even a little, one can expect 
to see an increase in insurgents, and based upon previous situations, if something is not done to re-establish 
the capacities, the state may tip into an unsustainable situation.”     
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to be small increases in the number of insurgents, i.e. the load on the system, but because 
the drop in resilience leads to more fruitful recruiting of dissidents, the ultimate 
consequence is a sustained increase in insurgent numbers.  The drop in resilience has 
caused the system to cross the crtitical threshold, or tipping point, such that the 
reinforcing process of recruitment is now dominating the overall system behavior.  This 
result shows the sensitivity of the system to the choice of policy prescriptions required for 
state stability.   
 
5.2   Policy Alternatives: Removing Insurgents vs. Reducing Anti-
Regime Messages 
 
We now examine some different policy alternatives.  In Figure 11, we identify two policy 
options:  
 (1)  the state might become better at removing insurgents, or  
(2) the state might improve its ability to respond to anti-regime messages, 
dampening the message strength.   
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Figure 11: Increasing the Regime Voice vs. Increased Removal Effectiveness 
 
Earlier, we identified that controlling the circulation of anti-regime messages (through 
curfews and other civil liberty limitations) would reduce the number of anti-regime 
messages in the short-term.  Considering the broader system, we see that a policy 
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prescription which encourages choking messages, if done through the suppression of 
liberties, would undermine regime resilience, and in the long run, such a policy 
prescription would cause more harm than good.  Increasing the ‘Regime Voice’ is 
different.  It implies that the strength of the anti-regime messages might become diluted 
in an acceptable fashion.   
 
For example, one such way to increase the regime voice is to sponsor a public campaign 
against the insurgents (to undermine their legitimacy).  As we observed in Jordan in 
November of 2005, as a result of extreme terrorist acts by Al Qaeda, the state was able to 
garner public sentiment. That can become a very successful method for controlling anti-
regime elements.  There are many other ways that states can increase the regime voice to 
counter the threats.  In Figure 12, we compare the results of changes in each of these 
inputs.   
27,000
25,250
23,500
21,750
20,000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Time (Year)
Preventing Recruitment
Better insurgent removal
Better insurgent removal
intelligence sharing
Preventing recruitment
moderate rhetoric
 
Figure 12: The Potential Effects of Increased Removal Effectiveness (Intelligence 
Sharing) versus Weakening the Message Strength (Moderate Rhetoric) 
 
The upper line12 shows the expected number of insurgents in a “base” case13 where the 
regime resilience measure is at a level such that if no action is taken, the result will be a 
continued growth in insurgents.  
 
Both of the proposed policy alternatives produce a reduction from this projected growth.  
However, there are significant differences in the long-term impact. Although the use of 
better insurgent removal policies14 does reduce the number of insurgents at any given 
time relative to the base case, the basic trajectory is not changed and insurgents do 
                                                 
12 The blue line in colored version. 
13 For country B 
14 The red line in colored version. 
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continue to grow.  On the other hand, when the state focuses on preventing recruitment 
through improving rhetoric, insurgent recruitment actually slows and insurgent levels 
actually decline, as shown as the lowest line15.  The policy alternative of moderating 
rhetoric causes a a fundamental shift in the system behavior to one of long-term decline 
in insurgent numbers,.  The system has crossed the tipping point and is now headed 
towards long-term stability because the policy intervention has significantly weakened 
the reinforcing processes of recruitment.  The recruiting processes are too weak to 
overcome the capabilities of the state, so the balancing loops that maintain stability 
dominate the behavior of the system. 
 
6.   Conclusion  
 
This paper focused on particular segments of an overall modeling strategy designed to 
help better understand the sources and consequences of state stability. We hope to 
continue our research to create a comprehensive integrative computational model, one 
that addresses all of the key features of the High Level Diagram presented earlier.    
 
Such an effort would enable us to integrate the dynamics of insurgency and dissidence 
within a more detailed and realistic representation of overall stability – all of the key 
loads vs. the entire major capacities.  In this paper, we illustrated the underlying interplay 
between critical elements that can produce useful insights, and we have shown that 
system dynamics can yield fruitful results for policy prescriptions, in this case on 
combating insurgent recruitment.   
  
System dynamics modeling enables us to understand, recognize and compare both short-
term and the long-term effects, simplifying complex dynamics, and providing a tool for 
policy analysis.  Scholars have been analyzing states, security, policy decisions, and 
nation-building for years: the military planners and policy analysts could gain insights 
from such work,.   
 
Finally, the use of system dynamics modeling, in conjunction with evidence from the 
social science is a major contribution to the development of computational social 
sciences.  There is a long history exploring the complexity of sovereign states in the 
social sciences.  Improving our understanding of the dynamics of complex systems with 
specific applications to the state will enhance the predictive value of modeling for 
purposes of policy and planning.   
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APPENDIX A 
Reference Sources for the Components of the Model 
 
 The purpose of this Appendix is to document the sources of the information about the 
causality between variables in this model.  This Appendix shows that research in both the 
public and private sector supports all of the critical links in this model.  The slide titles 
and “yellow oval” in the subsequent pages indicate which link the associated citations 
support.   
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APPENDIX B 
 
Hegre-Relative Risk of Civil War Memo 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Relative Risk of Civil War (RRCW) is a measure constructed in “Toward a 
Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992” by 
Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gelditsch (2001).  
 
The measure is a determinant of the likelihood of a civil war in a country.  
 
This appendix presents the Hegre Method, the variables used, and our use of this method 
to ‘validate’ Regime Resilience in this paper. 
 
1.1 Hegre et al.’s Approach: 
 
The functional form of the Relative Risk of Civil War (RRCW) equation is as follows: 
 
RRCW = exp((exp(α)*x1) + (β*x2) + (β2*x3) + (exp(γ) *x4) + (exp(δ) *x5) + (ε *x6) + 
(ζ *x7) + (η *x8) + (η2*x9) + (θ *x10)) 
 
where 
α  =  proximity of regime change  
β  =  level of democracy  
β2 =  level of democracy squared 
γ  =  proximity of civil war  
δ  =  proximity of independence  
ε  =  international war in country  
ζ  =  neighboring civil war 
η  =  level of development 
η2 =  level of development squared 
θ  =  ethnic heterogeneity.  
 
 
1.2 RRCW and Regime Resilience 
 
We have used the RRCW as a test against our own Regime Resilience measure by 
searching for an inverse relationship. The logic for such a relationship is that when 
Regime Resilience is high – when a country is being run well – the likelihood of civil war 
is low. Vice versa, when a regime is weak or threatened, there is a higher likelihood of 
civil war.  
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2. THE RRCW METHOD   
 
2.1   Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable in the Hegre research is the outbreak of civil war, as recorded in 
the Correlates of War Project. This measure is constructed by examining 152 countries 
from 1816-1992, with a civil war including any instance a country experiences a regime 
change.16 Formally defined, a civil war is “an internal war in which ‘(a) military action 
was involved, (b) the national government at the time was actively involved, (c) effective 
resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) 
occurred on both sides, and (d) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted;’” (Hegre, et al., 2001: 
36, with inner quotation from Singer and Small, 1994: part 3).  
 
Hegre et al. created two models: one where civil war is examined from 1816-1992, and 
one where civil war is examined post-World War II (from 1946-1992). The reason behind 
creating a more recent model is because of the substantial ways that both war and politics 
have changed over this time period. We use the second model (post-WWII on).   
 
2.2   Independent Variables and Control Variables 
 
Hegre and his team include several independent variables and control variables. Hegre et 
al. are interested in whether democracy and democratization stem civil war. However, to 
determine the effect of democracy and democratization, they had to control for several 
factors, partly including economic and social factors, as well as historical factors. 
 
3.  Operational Definitions 
 
3.1   The Variables 
 
Below is a brief definition of the variables and the source data used by Hegre, et al.: 
 
• Proximity of Regime Change: This is the amount of time since the regime most 
recently changed. It is a measure for how long the current regime has been in power. 
It is located in the Polity IV dataset, and is listed as “durable’ or ‘duration.’ It is listed 
in years, but needs to be multiplied by -1 (since a more recent regime change means 
greater likelihood of civil war), divided by days, and have its exponent taken to be 
consistent with the strengths of the other measures and to eradicate the negative 
value. We simply multiply by -1, divide by 365 (ignoring leap years), and calculate 
the exponent. 
 
• Level of Democracy: This is a measure that represents the level of democracy in a 
country, from 10 being a perfect democracy, to -10 being an autocracy. It is coded as 
polity2 in the Polity IV dataset.  
 
                                                 
16 Computationally, a regime change is defined as when a country undergoes a change of 2 or more on the 
commonly accepted democracy-autocracy scale, which ranges from -10 (totally autocratic) to 10 (totally 
democratic).  
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• Level of Democracy Squared: The logic for squaring the level of democracy is that 
much theory and research has suggested that strong autocracies are just as stable as 
strong democracies, and that states with weak regimes are the must vulnerable to 
conflict and civil war. Hegre et al. found that including this measure formed a far 
more accurate model.  
 
• Proximity of Civil War: This is a measure of the number of days since the last civil 
war ended. It can be found in the Correlates of War database. This value is given in 
days. To make this measure consistent, we again multiply by -1, divide by 5840, and 
take the exponent. 
 
• Proximity of Independence: This is a measure of the time since a country either 
formed or engaged in regime change. It can be found in the Correlates of War 
database. This value needs to be multiplied by -1, divided by days, and have its 
exponent taken, again so as to be consistent with the strengths of the other measures. 
We simply multiply by -1, divide by 365 (ignoring leap years), and calculate the 
exponent. 
 
• International War in Country: This is a dummy variable for whether two countries 
are fighting within the country of analysis. The measure can be found in the 
Correlates of War database.  
 
• Neighboring Civil War: This is a dummy variable for whether a neighboring country 
is undergoing civil war. It is constructed by examining the Correlates of War database 
to see if a civil war is taking place in a neighboring country.  
 
• Level of Development: This is a measure of the level of development, and it is 
provided by the Correlates of War database. It is a measure of energy consumption.  
 
• Level of Development Squared: The level of development of a country is clearly a 
decisive measure of civil war, and by squaring the value, the difference between 
developed and developing countries becomes more pronounced.  
 
• Ethnic Heterogeneity: This is a measure of the ethnic composition of the country. 
This measure can be found in Appendix B of Hegre, et al.’s paper, along with a list of 
the civil wars that were included in the analysis. The values range from 0 to 1.  
 
3.2   The Coefficients 
 
Each of the values above is multiplied by a specific coefficient (x1 to x10), as determined 
by regression analysis.  
 
Below are the coefficient for the specific variables:  
 
• x1   =  1.270 
• x2   = -0.002 
• x3   = -0.012 
• x4   =  1.160 
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• x5   =  1.510 
• x6   =  0.860 
• x7   =  0.097 
• x8   = -0.480 
• x9   = -0.066 
• x10 =  0.800 
 
4. CALCULATING THE RRCW 
 
Once a country is identified and the data is located across the years of interest, the 
calculation follows  the above equation and directions.  
 
Once the values are added, the exponent of the resulting summation needs to be taken in 
order to complete the calculations.  
 
The exponent is taken to pronounce the relationship, largely so that changes can be more 
easily depicted, and also so that the value does not come out as negative, since a 
likelihood of civil war cannot be negative.  
 
In order to make the RRCW value useful for our purposes, we had to perform an 
important transformation. The RRCW was a measure originally constructed based upon 
events as the unit of analysis. For our purposes, we wanted our unit of analysis to be in 
country-years, so we had to adapt the calculation method.  
 
5.  EVALUATION 
 
Our use of civil war is only one of the possible ways of ‘validating’ our regime resilience 
measure.  Others include ‘Political Capacity’ from the POFED model (J. Kugler). As 
such, the RRCW value was originally calculated to examine whether our measure of 
Regime Resilience was empirically plausible.  
 
We have compared the RRCW to Regime Resilience in three countries now, and we have 
found the correlations to be very consistent.  
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